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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RANCH HOMES, INC. I 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
Case No. 15467 
GREATER PARK CITY 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
I 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent/plaintiff Ranch Homes, Inc. (hereinafter 
"Ranch Homes") brought an action for damages for breach of 
an option agreement. 
II 
DISPOSITION ON APPEAL 
The judgment against appellant/defendant Greater 
Park City Company (hereinafter "GPCC") was affirmed, except 
the case was remanded to the trial court with directions to 
reduce the total damage award by $27,690.00. Costs were 
awarded to GPCC. 
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III 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
GPCC seeks a denial of Ranch Homes' petition for 
rehearing, and an affirmation of this Court's opinion. 
IV 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this matter are set forth in detail 
in the Court's opinion. 
v 
ARGUMENT 
The law in this State has been well settled for 
almost 100 years concerning when a petition for rehearing is 
appropriate. As the Court stated in Ducheneau v. House, 
4 Utah 483, 11 P. 618, 619 (1886): 
"The petition for rehearing states no new 
facts or grounds for a reversal of the judgment 
of the lower court. It is mainly a reargument 
of the case. We have repeatedly called atten-
tion to the fact that no rehearing will be 
granted where nothing new and important is 
offered for our consideration. We again say 
that we cannot grant a rehearing unless a 
strong showing therefor be made. A reargument, 
or an argument with the court upon the poi~ts 
of the decision, with no new light given, is 
not such a showing." 
Accord, Brown v. Pickard, 4 Utah 292, 11 P. 512 (1886); 
Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1912) where thi5 
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court stated: 
"In this case nothing was done or attempted 
by counsel, except to reargue the very proposi-
tions we had fully considered and decided. 
If we should write opinions on all the 
petitions for rehearings filed, we would 
have to devote a very large portion of our 
time in answering counsel's contentions 
a second time; and, if we should grant 
rehearings because they are demanded, we 
should do nothing else save to write and 
rewrite opinions in a few cases." 
Id., 129 P. at 624. 
A. THE COURT FULLY CONSIDERED IN ITS OPINION THE EFFECT 
TO BE GIVEN THE TESTIMONY OF GPCC'S EXPERT WITNESSES. 
Ranch Homes argued on pages 18-19 of its previous 
brief that the trial court was not duty bound to accept the 
testimony of Mr. Trayner, one of GPCC's experts, and it is not 
within the province of an appellate court to pass upon the 
evidence or the trial court's determination. In support, Ranch 
Homes cited Byram v. Payne, 58 Utah 536, 201 P. 401 {1921). 
GPCC responded by agreeing that the trier of fact 
is vested with broad discretion, but by disagreeing that such 
discretion is without limit. As submitted on page 9 of its 
reply brief, the uncontroverted testimony of a credible witness 
may not be arbitrarily disregarded by the trier of fact. In 
support, GPCC cited Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Co., 5 Utah 2d 
187, 299 P.2d 622 (1956) and other cases. 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This Court's opinion filed on March 13, 
decided the issue in favor of GPCC. The Court on 
I 
1979. I 
page 2 founc 
that the uncontroverted testimony of Herbert Trayner "estab-
lished the industry standard for the steps to be taken bya 
reasonably prudent developer after obtaining an option but 
before exercising it." The Court concluded on page 6 that: 
"Generally, it is the prerogative of the trial 
court to determine the facts and we will affirm 
when its determination thereof is supported by 
substantial evidence. However, when a finding 
is so plainly unreasonable that no trier of the 
fact could make such a finding, it cannot be 
said to be supported by substantial ·evidence 
and the finding will be rejected as a matter of 
law, and the fact determined otherwise." 
Thus, it is readily apparent that the matter, having already , 
been considered and decided by the Court, is not a proper issu:I 
for rehearing. 
B. THE COURT CONSIDERED THE TESTIMONY OF ALL 
WITNESSES BEFORE DETERMINING THE INDUSTRY 
STANDARDS TO BE FOLLOWED DURING AN OPTION PERIOD. 
The largest section of Ranch Homes' brief in support 
of its petition for rehearing, some 13 pages, is devoted to 
I 
quoting portions of the transcript which Ranch Homes believes 
controvert and impeach the testimony of GPCC 's experts. As in 
its initial brief, Ranch Homes' arguments once more miss the I 
point. Mr. Trayner' s testimony was uncontroverted concerning 
the industry standards for the steps to be taken by a reasonat 
-4-
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prudent developer after obtaining an option but before exercising 
it. Mr. Trayner's testimony was not only uncontroverted, but it 
was also supported by that of Professor Hashimoto {see R. 787, 
et~.), and Mr. Max Engeman, Executive Vice President of 
First Security State Bank {R. 901, et seq.). 
The quoted portions of the testimony of Ranch Hornes' 
principals and its banker, Lavern Nielson, contained in its 
latest brief relate only to the steps actually taken by Ranch 
Homes during the option period. None of Ranch Hornes' witnesses 
discussed the crucial question already decided by this Court 
against Ranch Homes -- what are the reasonable and foreseeable 
steps to be taken by a prudent developer during the option 
period. 
It is clear from the Court's opinion that the testimony 
of all witnesses was carefully considered. It is also clear 
that Ranch Homes' arguments made in the second section of its 
new brief have previously been brought to the attention of the 
Court. (See Ranch Homes' initial brief, pp. 2-9, 11-16, and 
especially 18-20, the latter dealing specifically with 
Mr. Trayner's testimony; and see GPCC's opening and reply 
briefs, which also dealt with this matter). Therefore, these 
arguments are not appropriate matters for rehearing. 
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C. THE COURT CAREFULLY CONSIDERED IN ITS 
OPINION WHETHER COMPENSATION SHOULD BE 
AWARDED FOR THE SERVICES OF FAHS AND TUCKETT, 
In arguing against that portion of the Court's 
opinion found on page 5 which stated that the services rendere: 
by Mr. Fahs and Mr. Tuckett were in performance of their normai 
corporate duties and were not proper items of damage for breac: 
of an option contract, Ranch Hornes ignored the Court's 
conclusion found on the same page that: 
"Even if the services were performed in 
reliance on the option agreement, such 
reliance was neither reasonable nor fore-
seeable for the same reasons discussed supra." 
This conclusion certainly renders moot the arguments made by 
Ranch Homes in the third section of its brief supporting the 
petition for rehearing. As noted above, the matters of fore· 
seeability and reasonableness, having once been decided by thi 
Court, are not now suitable issues for rehearing. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Since Ranch Hornes has merely attempted to reargue 
the very propositions the Court fully considered and decidedt 
its opinion, it is respectfully submitted that the petitionfc 
rehearing should be denied. 
DATED this / <f day of April, 1979. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By v~;., ({)~ 
Donald J. Winder feni 
Attorneys for Appellant/De 
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l979, I caused to be mailed, by first-class mail, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of Appellant's Answer to 
Petition for Rehearing to Bryce E. Roe and David E. Leta, 
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